First Party fraud management:A framework for the retails industry by Shah, Mahmood & Amasiatu, Chioma Vivian
  
First Party fraud management: A 
framework for the retails industry 
 
Shah, M & Amasiatu, CV 
 
Author post-print (accepted) deposited by Coventry University’s Repository 
 
Original citation & hyperlink:  
Shah, M & Amasiatu, CV 2018, 'First Party fraud management: A framework for the 
retails industry' International Journal of Retail & Distribution Management, vol 46, 
no. 4, pp. 350 - 363  
https://dx.doi.org/10.1108/IJRDM-10-2016-0185    
 
DOI 10.1108/IJRDM-10-2016-0185 
ESSN 0959-0552 
 
Publisher: Sage 
 
Copyright © and Moral Rights are retained by the author(s) and/ or other copyright 
owners. A copy can be downloaded for personal non-commercial research or study, 
without prior permission or charge. This item cannot be reproduced or quoted extensively 
from without first obtaining permission in writing from the copyright holder(s). The 
content must not be changed in any way or sold commercially in any format or medium 
without the formal permission of the copyright holders.  
 
This document is the author’s post-print version, incorporating any revisions agreed during 
the peer-review process. Some differences between the published version and this version 
may remain and you are advised to consult the published version if you wish to cite from 
it.  
 
1 
 
First Party Fraud Management: Framework for the Retail Industry 
Abstract 
Purpose - First Party fraud in which consumers commit fraud against retailers is a growing 
problem. Research in this area is very limited which means that there is almost no guidance 
available to mitigate this problem. Existing fraud management frameworks focus on the 
management of other fraud, such as identity theft or employee instigated fraud. Due to the 
different nature of these frauds, these frameworks do not adequately address first party fraud. 
Therefore we propose an adapted version of the framework which is specific to first party fraud 
management.  
Design/methodology/approach - We conducted a systematic literature review and 
compared/contrasted a number of existing fraud management frameworks in related domains, 
and found Wilhelm’s fraud management framework the most promising for adaptation and 
application to the first party fraud context. By modifying an existing framework according to 
the contextual requirements, we make the framework much more relevant to first party fraud 
management.  
Practical implications - Our framework could help retail managers better understand and 
manage this growing business problem and open new streams for further research.  
Originality/value - This research also makes an important contribution by proposing a 
framework and by helping bridge a glaring and problematic gap in existing literature and 
opening up new streams of research. 
Keywords Fraud, e-fraud, first party fraud, consumer behaviour, framework, 
holistic, retailing, retail industry 
Paper type Systematic Literature Review 
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Introduction 
The amount of losses online retail organisations suffer annually to fraud has resulted in growing 
attention being devoted to the management of fraud risks in organisations. Consequently, this 
has increased research interests in organisational ethical decision-making, organisational or 
workplace fraud and the preventive frameworks for such frauds (Ferrell et al., 2008; Malgwi 
and Rakovski, 2009; Murphy and Dacin, 2011). Although an increasing level of attention is 
being devoted to understanding consumer misbehaviours and/or first party frauds (Abdelhadi 
et al., 2014; Fullerton and Punj, 2004; Harris and Reynolds, 2004; King and Dennis, 2006; 
Rosenbaum et al., 2011), relatively little has been documented in literature in terms of how to 
manage such problems.  
There is no legal definition of first party fraud as of yet. For the purpose of this research, we 
used the definition of (CIFAS, 2012) which states, “first party fraud as fraud committed by a 
customer that does not involve the use of stolen identity or third party involvement”. 
Individuals commit such acts to obtain goods/services or to evade payment for goods/services. 
Within the context of exchange, consumers behave in fraudulent ways when they go against 
their contractual agreement and behave in ways that solely benefits them whilst resulting in a 
loss to their exchange partner (retailer). Expectations of behaviour are formed through rules, 
laws or regulations (Moschis and Cox, 1989) that regulate the exchange process. The basic rule 
of exchange assumes that successful exchanges are ‘goal-oriented dyadic interactions’ 
(Solomon et al., 1985) between two or more partners in which one partner (consumer) transfers 
cash in exchange for products/services from another partner (seller/retailer). However, recent 
findings suggest that this is not always the case (King and Dennis, 2003, 2006; Piron and 
Young, 2000; Schmidt et al., 1999; Rosenbaum et al., 2011), as consumers sometimes feign 
exchanges at the expense of retailers. The most common forms of first party fraud in the retail 
industry are: deshopping or return of used merchandise, chargeback or friendly fraud, bust out 
fraud, and misrepresentation of details (Amasiatu and Shah, 2014, 2015). 
The prevalence of this type of fraud is startling. For example, King et al. (2007) indicated that 
up to 50% of returned merchandise with a mass market retailer was fraudulent with an 
estimated cost in the six-figure region, while Harris (2010) reported that 92 percent of their 
sample admitted to fraudulently returning goods after using or damaging them. Harris (2008, 
2010) further identified ten facilitators of fraudulent returning, amongst them including past 
experience of successful fraudulent returns, positive attitude towards fraudulent returning and 
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consumer awareness of retailers’ liberal return policies, and argued that the relative ease of 
perpetrating first party fraud has led to the increasing societal acceptance of such frauds.   
Many frauds are now carried out online. More recently, cyberspace fraud has aroused interest 
in the research community, with some scholars noting that online retailing may provide a 
potential promising avenue for the continued perpetuation and growth of first party fraud (Hjort 
and Lantz, 2012). The convenient and anonymous nature of the internet coupled with the 
availability of opportunities for misbehaviour online makes fraudulent behaviours much more 
attractive, making it easier for consumers to misbehave without any resultant negative affect 
(Reynolds and Harris, 2005). For example, it has been revealed that fraudulent chargebacks by 
customers is the second most costly fraud retailers face (LexisNexis, 2012), accounting for 41 
percent of all fraud losses by US and Canadian retailers, estimated at $1.4 billion (CyberSource 
Corporation, 2012). Furthermore, a recent survey of British retailers found that over 90 percent 
regard online fraudulent consumer behaviour a growing threat to their businesses (Retail Fraud, 
2013).  
With online retailing representing the fastest growing retail distribution channel in Europe 
(Centre for Retail Research, 2014), first party fraud may become an even bigger challenge for 
businesses. However, despite evidence of the prevalence of first party fraud, no previous 
research has examined or developed a framework that retailers can use to manage/mitigate 
incidents of such behaviours. This paper is therefore an attempt to address this gap in existing 
research. 
More recently, researchers have begun to highlight the importance of approaching fraud 
management from a holistic perspective. For example, Furlan and Bajec (2008) and Bishop 
(2004) argue that most fraud management/prevention literature has typically focused on fraud 
detection methods rather than the full activities in an anti-fraud framework. Bishop (2004) 
emphasised that whilst detection is a crucial activity in an anti-fraud framework, excessive 
focus on detection activities can be unprofitable for organisations as much of lost funds do not 
end up being recovered. This view is consistent with many other researchers, such as Durbin 
(2007) and Wilhelm (2004), who pointed out that superior fraud loss performance can be 
attained by adopting a holistic approach to fraud management and successfully integrating and 
balancing the activities in an anti-fraud framework (Durbin, 2007; Bishop, 2004; Wilhelm, 
2004). Wilhelm (2004) and McGinley and McCall (2009) further make the case for an anti-
fraud framework, arguing that fraud continues to be a growing problem for businesses despite 
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technological advances in fraud detection. The answer, they argue, lies in an anti-fraud 
framework.  
The aim of this research is to propose a framework that retailers can use to manage first party 
fraud. The large amounts lost to first party fraud and the absence of a framework in literature 
to manage first party fraud provides sufficient motivation for this study. Such a framework 
could help retailers protect their bottom lines and provide a competitive advantage in pricing 
for (e) retailers, rather than increasing merchandise prices to cover the losses. Using an anti-
fraud framework can significantly limit fraud losses, maintain investor confidence by 
protecting an organisation’s bottom line and protect an organisation’s reputation (Durbin, 
2007). Our framework, which is an extension of the existing fraud management lifecycle 
theory, should help retailers better understand and manage this growing business problem. 
Our paper is organised as follows: first, we explain our methodological construct. Next, we 
review existing fraud management frameworks, and then finally, we discuss the extended 
framework, conclusion and future research agenda.  
Methodology 
The research approach adopted is a systematic review of literature. Literature search was 
conducted on the following databases: Business Source Premier/EBSCOhost, IEEE Digital 
Library, Scopus, ScienceDirect, Web of Science and Google Scholar. Our search strings 
consisted of the following: 
1 fraud AND management AND framework 
2 fraud AND holistic AND framework 
3 fraud AND prevention AND framework 
4 fraud AND prevention AND management 
5 customer misbehaviour AND retail  
6 dysfunctional customer behaviour AND retail 
7 consumer fraud AND retail 
8 first party fraud AND retail 
9 fraudulent customer returns OR deshopping AND retail 
We ensured the relevance of the articles by requiring that the fraud management articles contain 
at least one of the following words: ‘identity fraud’, ‘e-fraud’, ‘mobile fraud’, and used related 
words, e.g. customer/consumer to ensure relevant articles were captured. For the customer 
fraud literature, we ensured articles contained at least one of the following words or synonyms: 
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‘retail borrowing’, ‘unethical retail disposition’, ‘fraudulent returns’, ‘fraudulent consumer 
behaviour’ and ‘customer fraud’. 
In addition, we scanned reference lists of articles, and other articles deemed to be relevant were 
also included. This helped in ensuring coverage of the most relevant papers. Articles that bore 
no relevance to the research objectives were excluded. For the fraud management literature, 
we excluded all articles that did not describe fraud management from a holistic view: this 
included articles that addressed technological solutions in one area of fraud management. We 
also excluded materials that did not relate to first party fraud or address any of its forms in 
retailing. This included articles that related only to computer-related frauds such as phishing 
etc, customer theft, customer rage, physical store violence, sexual harassment of employees by 
customers, or articles that solely related to forms of consumer misbehaviour in other industries 
such as tourism and hospitality. 
We carefully read the article abstracts bearing in mind our inclusion and exclusion criteria, and 
44 publications were found and reviewed. Of the 44 publications found, 9 publications related 
to fraud management in general, with 5 articles on anti-fraud frameworks. The remaining 35 
publications addressed customer fraud or misbehaviour.  
Fraud Management Frameworks 
Here, we evaluated some fraud management frameworks from the literature to see which one 
would be most suitable for first party fraud management. 
 Furlan and Bajec (2008) Framework 
Furlan and Bajec (2008) proposed a framework for health insurance fraud. Their research 
focused on five main concepts: process, activity, activity goal, fraud management system and 
fraud management system characteristic (see fig 1 below). Six fraud management activities 
were identified: Deterrence, Prevention, Detection, Investigation, Sanction & Redress and 
Monitoring.  
According to the authors, deterrence of fraud starts with reducing the probability of fraud 
occurring by removing the elements of the fraud triangle. Next, the organisation should detect 
fraudulent claims early before losses are incurred. The deployment of effective fraud detection 
techniques should help uncover suspicious claims for investigation and sanction. Finally, 
constant monitoring of fraud management activities should help an organisation to continually 
assess and improve its counter-fraud strategy.  
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Furlan and Bajec (2008) claim that every fraud management activity is part of one or more 
business process, and that these activities have goals. There are two business processes; the 
first process is curative and is concerned with detecting fraud once it occurs. The activities 
performed within this process include detection, investigation and sanctioning. The second 
process is preventive and is concerned with stopping fraud from happening. The activities 
performed within this process include early detection, investigation, prevention and 
sanctioning. The authors also suggest that there are two ongoing activities: deterrence and 
monitoring. Deterrence decreases fraud and therefore contributes to the fraud detection activity. 
Whereas, monitoring focuses on assessing the efficiency of the core fraud management 
processes (see fig 2 below).  
Furlan and Bajec (2008) identified different fraud management system/information system 
characteristics that enable effective and efficient support to the fraud management activities, 
although they noted that the system characteristics may vary across domains. The authors, 
however, offered no clear distinction between prevention and detection activities. Instead, they 
refer to ‘prevention’ as early detection and ‘detection’ as the detection of successful frauds.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig 1: Furlan and Bajec (2008) research concept 
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Fig 2: Fraud management activities and their relations (Furlan and Bajec (2008) 
 Fraud Management Lifecycle Theory by Wilhelm (2004)  
Wilhelm (2004) proposed the Fraud Management Lifecycle Theory consisting of eight 
components that drive success or failure in fraud management: Deterrence, Prevention, 
Detection, Mitigation, Analysis, Policy, Investigation and Prosecution (See figure 3 below). 
Deterrence activities are those intended to discourage attempts at fraud. Prevention stage 
activities are those intended to prevent fraud from occurring or to secure an organisation against 
fraud. Deploying protective systems, processes and procedures that make fraud harder to 
commit is crucial in preventing fraud. Detection stage activities are those focused on 
uncovering the presence of fraud. Mitigation stage activities are those intended to reduce the 
extent and the amount of the associated fraud losses. The analysis stage includes performing 
two basic functions: identify and understand fraud losses that occur despite deterrence, 
prevention, detection and mitigation stage activities along with monitoring the performance of 
each of the other stages of the fraud management lifecycle. Policy stage activities are those 
intended to create and/or modify existing fraud policies to reduce the occurrence of fraud. The 
focus of Investigation is to gather enough evidence to stop fraudulent activity and to assist in 
offender prosecution/restitution, while Prosecution activity is focused on undertaking legal 
action against offenders.  
Wilhelm (2004) subsequently applied this framework to four different industries and found the 
existence of all eight framework components in the industries. The author further suggests the 
importance of balancing the framework components, i.e. the correct allocation of resources to 
ensure coordinated and effective fraud response.  
Wilhelm (2004) suggests that interactions between the different components do not necessarily 
occur in a sequential manner; rather the different components interact with each other giving 
rise to a web of interactions, in a network-like manner. Finally, Wilhelm (2004) argues that 
Prevention Investigation Sanction Detection 
Monitoring 
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successful integration of Information Technology facilitates these linkages, interactions and 
interrelationships between the framework’s components. These interactions and 
interrelationships between the framework’s components ensure that the framework is flexible 
and adaptable.  
 
Fig 3: Linear Representation of the Fraud Management Lifecycle Theory 
Source: Wilhelm (2004)  
 
 US Government Accountability Office (GAO) Framework by Kutz (2006) and 
 Ghosh (2010) anti-ID Fraud Framework 
The US Government Accountability Office Framework developed the framework for fraud 
prevention, detection and prosecution to minimise fraud, waste and abuse in disaster assistance 
programs such as the Huricane Katrina and Rita disaster relief program (Kutz, 2006). 
According to the framework (see figure 4), a well-designed fraud management strategy consists 
of 3 crucial elements: prevention, detection & monitoring, and investigations & prosecutions. 
The framework also suggests that weaknesses identified through detection and monitoring 
should be used to make improvements to the first stage of the framework - prevention. Ghosh 
(2010) proposed a 4-component framework (see figure 5) similar to that by the GAO, with the 
exception of ‘sanction ‘prosection’ and ‘monitoring’ activities. However, the Ghosh 
framework (2010) provides an additional component - ‘solve’ which is not in the GAO 
framework. The components are: Prevent, Detect, Investigate and Solve. ‘Solve’ refers to 
identifying a ‘fingerprint’ (historical behaviour patterns) based on past and present behaviour 
which can be used to predict future behaviour and to trace known fraud chains. We have not 
chosen these frameworks because they did not meet three of our criteria: functionality, 
comprehensiveness and adaptability. 
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Fig 4: Framework for Prevention, Detection and Prosecution (Kutz, 2006) 
 
 
Fig 5: Anti-ID Fraud Framework (Ghosh, 2010) 
 Identity Fraud Enterprise Management Framework (Jamieson et al., 2007) 
Jamieson et al. (2007) proposed an identity fraud enterprise management framework from an 
organisational perspective, derived from a review of existing frameworks (see figure 6). Their 
framework consists of three main phases in fraud management: anticipatory, reactionary and 
remediation. The phases in turn consist of 13 sequential stages (policy, risk assessment, 
deterrence, prevention, detection, mitigation, analysis, incident management, review, 
investigation, prosecution, recovery and restoration). Each of the three phases in turn have both 
a learning step and procedure adjustment step. Jamieson et al. (2007) claimed that the purpose 
is to introduce innovations into the framework. Although a comprehensive framework, the 
separation of phases and stages make the framework more suitable for implementation in 
bigger organisations; thereby limiting its adaptability. For this reason of complexity and limited 
adaptability, we have not chosen this framework. 
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Fig 6: Identity fraud enterprise management framework (Source: Jamieson et al., 2007) 
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framework. The Furlan and Bajec (2008), Jamieson et al. (2007) and Wilhelm (2004) 
frameworks share the most similarities. However, some differences exist. For example, Furlan 
and Bajec (2008) specifically name a ‘monitoring’ component, while Wilhelm’s (2004) and 
Jamieson et al. (2007) include monitoring within the ‘analysis’ and ‘review’ stages 
respectively. Similarly, the ‘mitigation’ stage activity in Wilhelm’s (2004) and Jamieson et al’s 
(2007) frameworks are performed within the ‘detection’ stage activity in Furlan and Bajec’s 
(2008) framework. One possible reason for the differences could be because the frameworks 
were developed to manage different types of frauds and therefore reflect the nature of fraud 
that they manage.  
Bearing in mind the aim of our research which is to ‘find a fraud management framework which 
can be adapted and applied in the retail context for the management of first party fraud’, we 
developed the following evaluation criteria:  
1. It must be functional. In other words, it should be capable of functioning/fulfilling its 
objective. 
2. It must be adaptable. In other words, it should be flexible and able to be modified for 
a new purpose. 
3. It must be comprehensive (but not complex), covering many stages of fraud 
management. In other words, the framework should incorporate different components. 
Researchers, such as Furlan and Bajec, (2008) and Bishop, (2004) observe that a 
holistic fraud management framework involves many activities 
4. It must emphasise ongoing improvement: In other words, performance monitoring 
and evaluation of the anti-fraud program (as a way of driving improvement) is crucial 
(Bishop, 2004; Furlan and Bajec, 2008; Pergola and Sprung, 2005). 
5. It must be empirically derived 
6. Each of the components should have a clear focus: In other words, it should 
distinguish between prevention, deterrence and detection. This is because these 
activities are sometimes used synonymously and can contribute to confusion within an 
organisation as to the focus of each of the activities. This point of view has also been 
supported by Wilhelm (2004).  
Table 1 below shows a comparison of these frameworks using our evaluation criteria. We found 
that the fraud management lifecycle theory by Wilhelm (2004) provides a promising 
framework for first party fraud management in (e) retailing with some modifications.  
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Although Furlan and Bajec’s (2008) framework met four of our six evaluation criteria, it was 
not chosen because it makes no distinction between prevention and detection stage activities, 
which to many other researchers (Wilhelm, 2004; Ghosh, 2010, Kutz, 2006) are clearly distinct 
components. In addition, this framework was only applied in the health sector, and so it is 
difficult to determine if it can be successfully applied to other sectors and other fraud types. 
On the other hand, Jamieson et al.’s (2007) framework, though comprehensive, was not chosen 
due to its complexity and limited adaptability. The separation of phases and stages increases 
the complexity of this framework, and the sequential nature of the stages may make the 
framework less adaptable to different sectors/work environments and fraud problems. Having 
a framework that is easily adaptable to different fraud challenges is key to managing fraud. 
Due to the complexity and adaptability issues, this framework was not chosen. 
The other frameworks by Kutz (2006) and Ghosh (2010) were also not chosen because they 
did not meet three of our evaluation criteria: functionality, comprehensiveness and adaptability. 
These two frameworks were the least comprehensive of all the frameworks, although this may 
be because of the focus of the frauds and sectors in the studies. However, the absence of 
deterrence (a vital fraud management component) was in the authors’ opinion a serious 
limitation of the frameworks for this study. Without any deterrence effort, organisations expose 
themselves to unnecessary fraud losses and run the risk of fire fighting fraud, which is not cost 
effective (Wilhelm, 2004). Ultimately, the importance of a fraud management framework lies 
in its applicability in different work environments and sectors; due to the limited scope and 
depth of the participating sectors/companies in the above mentioned four frameworks, they 
were not chosen. In contrast, our chosen framework by Wilhelm (2004) is comprehensive, 
functional, adaptable, and has been applied in different industries. It has also shown to result 
in significant fraud loss reduction. 
<Insert Table One: A comparison of different fraud frameworks> 
 
First Party Fraud Management Framework 
Our proposed model (Figure 7 below) which is an extension of the fraud management lifecycle 
theory consists of 7 elements: Deterrence, Prevention, Detection, Investigation, Sanction and 
Redress, Analysis  Measuring and Monitoring, and Policy. The components can, but do not 
necessarily, occur in a sequential manner. We briefly describe the framework stages below:  
Deterrence 
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The importance of deterence has been highlighted in the literature as key to implementing 
successful anti-fraud programs (Wilhelm, 2004; Furlan and Bajec, 2008), and this is likely to 
be the same for first party fraud. The opportunistic nature of frauds, the cost of investigation, 
and the underlying motivations for engaging in them make deterrence a vital step in any anti-
fraud framework, and the first step/component in our first party management framework. From 
the fraud triangle, there are three fraud risk factors or conditions: perceived 
pressure/motivation, perceived opportunity and rationalisation (Cressey, 1971). The presence 
of these elements in first party fraud is demonstrated below: 
- Motives/Pressure: first party fraud is opportunistic in nature. Some research suggest 
that consumers who engage in first party fraud often cite a number of motives/reasons 
for engaging in the behaviour, such as: economic distress, low self-esteem (deshopping 
expensive clothing to support their need for acceptance), revenge motives (stemming 
from negative attitude towards larger businesses), anomie, differential association/peer 
influence, etc. (Reynolds and Harris, 2005; Rosenbaum et al., 2011; King and Dennis, 
2006).  
- Opportunity: the availability of opportunities for fraud, ease of committing first party 
fraud, low likelihood of detection, and little or no consequences for commiting first 
party fraud has been reported to be driving this behaviour (King and Dennis, 2003, 
2006).  
- Rationalisation: first party fraud offenders use rationalisation to either argue that their 
behaviour does not hurt anyone (and is therefore excusable), that their victim/retailer 
deserves the wrongdoing, or that circumstantial pressures outside their control led to 
their behaviour (Harris and daunt, 2011; Rosenbaum et al., 2011). 
Some of the elements of the triangle such as differential association, revenge motives against 
larger business and presence of opportunities can be controlled (by (e) retailers) through public 
awareness and reduction of opportunities. For example, Fullerton and Punj, (2004) pointed out 
that “The educational approach uses promotional messages to persuade consumers to unlearn 
patterns of misconduct and to strengthen moral constraints which inhibit misbehaviour”. The 
benefits of public awareness about this fraud are as follows: firstly, educational campaigns 
targeting mainstream consumers can be used to increase social disapproval of the behaviour 
and alter/thwart some of the rationalisations employed by offenders to justify the behaviour. 
For example, denial of injury rationalisation can be thwarted by stressing the costs of such 
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behaviour. Secondly, promotional messages can be used to communicate to the public that 
retailers are ethical and just organisations, as a way to thwart denial of victim (particularly 
those against big business committed solely for revenge). Thirdly, education can be used to 
communicate the disincentives and consequences of committing fraud (Cuganesan and Lacey, 
2003) as well as the direct and indirect costs of fraud to both retailers and the public. The 
propensity to engage in fraud or crime increases when an individual’s perception of the rewards 
of their behaviour outweighs the costs or consequences of that behaviour.  
Some studies suggest that the recovery rate of fraud losses is very low (Wilhelm, 2004), and 
so deterring fraud from happening in the first instance should be a vital first step in managing 
fraud. 
Prevention 
The next step after deterrence has failed is to prevent fraud from occurring. Prevention means 
The activities in this stage are focused on  preventing fraud from occurring or making fraud 
harder to commit, when attempted. Prevention activities directly address the opportunities that 
aid first party fraud. Technology plays an important role in prevention, i.e. use of address 
verification, credit checks, and 3-D secure authentication could make first party fraud harder 
to commit (Amasiatu and Shah, 2014). 
The importance of promoting zero tolerance to fraud in the workplace as a key preventive 
measure is highlighted by Button and Brooks, (2009) and Brooks et al. (2009), who concluded 
that training and screening employees should be an integral part of prevention. 
Staff involvement in first party fraud can present opportunities which consumers may exploit, 
for example, the potential for delivery men to steal parcels. It is therefore imperative that 
employee involvement is limited in order to minimise the opportunities for fraud. Activities to 
undertake in this stage may include performing background/criminal checks on employees 
working in areas such as delivery, warehouse, etc., to reduce the possibility of employee 
involvement in first party fraud. Employees should also receive training on the organisations’ 
code of conduct and agree to comply with such standards of behaviour. Fraud awareness 
training should also be provided to employees specific to their duties. For example, training 
given to delivery personnel should alert them that their employer will not tolerate such 
behaviour. On the other hand, contact centre and investigating analysts should also receive 
training on red flags and how to detect fraudulent behaviours or opportunistic customer claims. 
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Detection 
Detection stage activity is concerned with identifying the presence of fraud. The very nature of 
retailing is centred on improving customer experience, and sometimes this may come in the 
way of fraud prevention (Amasiatu and Shah, 2014, 2015). Employees have a role to play in 
detecting fraud as claims are normally received by frontline staff, so their ability to detect and 
stop fraudulent behaviour from continuing is crucial at this stage. Wilhelm (2004) separates 
these two activities into detection and mitigation stage activities; however, in the case of first 
party fraud, these activities can be undertaken within the same stage. For example, in the case 
of the return of used merchandise, returns can be denied by staff if suspected to be fraudulent 
or used. Information systems can support this activity by providing information to assist front 
line claims staff in detecting fraudulent behaviour and/or opportunistic attempts. Some 
researchers, such as Speights and Hilinski (2005) suggest the use of technology to track 
consumer return behaviour and subsequently use this to deny returns. Such a system can also 
be used to monitor customer claims. The authors further add that retailers can use such a system 
to analyse the impact of changes on the consumer, protect against fraud and abuse, and alter 
return policies (Speights and Hilinski, 2005). Most importantly, intelligence sharing between 
retailers may be vital in detecting and mitigating serial cross-organisational abuse.  This has 
been used for the management of other fraud problems, i.e. insurance frauds. 
Investigation 
When suspicious behaviour has been detected, investigators investigate it it should be 
investigated to determine if it is fraudulent or not. Investigation stage activities obtain sufficient 
evidence to stop first party fraud and to provide support for offender sanctioning and redress. 
When a suspicious claim has been forwarded to an investigator, the investigators’ duty is to 
investigate it and determine if it is fraudulent or not. Maintaining an effective relationship with 
law enforcement is also important. Rigorous investigations which culminate in the prosecution 
or sanction of fraudsters can have a deterrent effect on future behaviour. Information 
technology can support this stage (as well as the other framework stages) by helping manage 
large volumes of data and enabling investigators to spot anomalies (Furlan and Bajec, 2008).  
Sanction and redress 
Environmental factors (regulatory environment and the society) have an impact on fraud 
management (Wilhelm, 2004), and this is also true with first party fraud. In the UK, fraud is 
often not a police priority (Brooks et al., 2009), and first party fraud is hardly considered 
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criminal enough for prosecution by both the public and law enforcement officials  (King and 
Dennis, 2003), hence the need to go through the civil recovery process. Although studies 
suggest that retailers largely ignore these losses and often do not punish offenders (Amasiatu 
and Shah, 2014; King and Dennis, 2003; King et al., 2007), we argue that retailers should do 
more to punish offenders and obtain restitution, as a deterrent. Rather than viewing these frauds 
as the cost of doing business, retailers should pursue approaches such as rejecting fraudulent 
claims, rejecting further purchases from fraudulent offenders/accounts, as well as maintaining 
a closer working relationship with law enforcement officials to punish offenders and reclaim 
lost funds. Sanctioning and redress is a different from prosecution, in that successful 
prosecution does not always result in reimbursement of funds (Furlan and Bajec, 2008). Given 
the current landscape, we use ‘sanction and redress’ in our adapted framework. 
Measurement and monitoring 
Effective measurement and monitoring is crucial in an anti-fraud framework. Effective 
measurement and monitoring helps determine or assess if counter fraud efforts are meeting 
their ultimate objective of reducing fraud (Furlan and Bajec, 2008). The activities undertaken 
at this stage should involve: monitoring the performance of the other stages of the framework, 
understanding first party fraud losses and ongoing measurement and monitoring of first party 
fraud. Feedback from these assessments can be used to inform the implementation or 
improvement of fraud detection and prevention activities, deploy policies to address identified 
loopholes, as well as improve the other framework stages. Regular fraud monitoring is 
important because it can help an organisation quantify the benefits of an anti-fraud framework, 
hence it might be a better way of justifying anti-fraud investment. For example, McGinley and 
McCall (2009) suggest that ‘quantifying the benefits of an anti-fraud strategy requires tracking 
metrics over time’ (McGinley and McCall, 2009, p. 3). As first party frauds are under-reported 
and currently not receiving enough interest from businesses (Amasiatu and Shah, 2014, 2015), 
ongoing measurement and monitoring can help retailers better assess the performance of their 
overall counter-fraud strategy. 
Policy 
Having a comprehensive policy is key to managing fraud.  Policy stage activities are focused 
on the creation, modification and deployment of policies to reduce first party fraud. 
Performance feedback from the monitoring stage is used at this stage to improve the overall 
anti-fraud framework. For example, performance feedback highlighting process weaknesses 
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can be addressed by deploying/modifying policies to address identified loopholes/weaknesses.  
Policy stage activities are most frequently undertaken by managers.  
 
Discussion 
Although first party fraud is a growing problem in the retail sector, research in this area is still 
very limited, which means there is little or no guidance available for managing such problems. 
Our framework should help (e) retailers, many of which currently regard this frauds as a cost 
of doing business, manage the growing incidence of first party fraud. 
Our proposed framework extends Wilhelm’s (2004) framework within the domain of first party 
fraud management in the retail context. We chose the fraud management lifecycle theory by 
Wilhelm (2004) because it is comprehensive, adaptable and is functional across various 
industries. We further extend this framework by adapting and applying it in a different industry 
(retail) and context (first party fraud). The proposed framework in this paper extends the fraud 
management lifecycle theory not only by interpreting the framework stages in the context of 
retail first party fraud management, but also by the addition of the ‘Sanction and redress’ stage 
to the framework.  
Raising public consciousness of the consequences of first party fraud as a deterrent measure, 
prevention and detection of first party frauds once deterrence has failed, investigating and 
sanctioning perpetrators, measuring and monitoring first party losses and the deployment or 
modification of policies that make first party fraud difficult to commit (Fullerton and Punj, 
2004; Speights and Hilinski, 2005; King and Dennis, 2003; Wilhelm, 2004; Furlan and Bajec, 
2008) should help retailers better manage their first party fraud losses.  
Senior management support has been identified as key to implementing successful anti-fraud 
programs, and managing first party fraud is no exception (Button and Brooks, 2009; Wilhelm, 
2004). Rather than viewing these frauds as the cost of doing business, the framework in this 
study presents a guide to help retailers devise plans for dealing with this problem.  With the 
growth in e-commerce (making it much more difficult to detect fraudulent behaviour), we 
anticipate that first party problem will become an even greater threat to retail profitability if 
not adequately managed. 
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We argue particularly for the importance of deterrence as a vital component of the framework. 
Given the growing societal acceptance of these frauds and the lack of interest by law 
enforcement officials, we believe that retailers should do more to speak up and raise greater 
awareness of this problem, else it may be difficult to garner adequate public concern to increase 
social disapproval and generate interest within the law enforcement community.    
 
Fig 7: Framework of first party fraud management 
Conclusion 
Growing evidence of the frequency of first party fraud has driven the need for a fraud 
management framework. We reviewed five fraud management frameworks: Furlan and Bajec’s 
(2008) framework, fraud management lifecycle theory (Wilhelm, 2004), US Government 
Accountability Office (GAO) framework (Kutz, 2006), Anti-ID fraud framework (Ghosh, 
2010) and Identity fraud enterprise management framework (Jamieson et al., 2007). We chose 
and found the fraud management lifecycle theory (Wilhelm, 2004) suitable for adaptation and 
application to the first party fraud management context. The purpose of the framework is to 
address the gap in the literature on first party fraud by proposing an adapted first party fraud 
management framework. As with all frauds, we acknowledge that it will be difficult to 
completely eliminate first party fraud. However, our framework should help retail managers to 
better manage the prevalence of first party fraud. By extending the existing fraud management 
lifecycle theory, we make it more relevant to the first party fraud context. Our extended fraud 
management framework consists of 7 activities: Deterrence, Prevention, Detection, 
Investigation, Sanction and Redress, Measurement and Monitoring and Policy. 
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We acknowledge that our adapted framework is theoretical in nature and it would be pre-
mature to claim its applicability or usefulness in practice without testing it empirically. We 
propose that this framework should be tested using both quantitative (to test the gernal 
applicability) and qualitative (to know the depth of different aspects of framework in practice) 
methods.  
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